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SHINING THE LIGHT A LITTLE BRIGHTER:
SHOULD ITEM 303 SERVE AS A BASIS FOR
LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5?
Lauren M. Mastronardi*
This Note discusses a securities disclosure issue stemming from a split
between the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. The question presented
is whether failure to comply with a disclosure requirement created by Item
303 of Regulation S-K can provide a basis for liability under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The Ninth Circuit
held that such violation does not provide a basis for liability. Conversely,
in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, the Second Circuit explicitly
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and concluded that this violation may
serve as a basis for liability. This Note examines the rationales behind
each decision, as well as the rationales behind disclosure regulations more
generally, and ultimately concludes that Item 303 violations should serve as
a basis for 10b-5 liability, as long as all of the remaining requirements of a
10b-5 claim are met.
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INTRODUCTION
Information is one of the most valuable tools in society. Not only does it
foster intelligent communication and knowledgeable decision making, it
also reduces the risk of inefficiency and waste. Information can, however,
also be overwhelming and burdensome.1 In a time when information is
more accessible than ever, it is vital to focus attention on that information
which is most useful. This becomes especially important when evaluating
securities regulation.
From the beginning, securities regulation has been focused on
disclosure.2 While issuers were often willing to disclose information that
would attract investors, many felt that regulation was needed to ensure that
these investors were not being deceived or misled.3 Over time, Congress
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have developed and
modified many different regulations in an attempt to ensure a fair and
efficient securities markets.4 One such regulation is Item 303 of Regulation
S-K (“Item 303”).5 The SEC has long viewed Item 303 as an important and

1. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, Speech at the
National Association of Corporate Directors—Leadership Conference 2013 (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806 (noting concern about the
possibility that current disclosure obligations can lead to an “information overload”)
[https://perma.cc/ND3P-YBCP].
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016).
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unique opportunity for investors to get a glimpse of the company “through
the eyes of management.”6
While rules and regulations are important, they are arguably ineffective
without an appropriate enforcement mechanism.7 Thus, a court’s decision
that a particular violation may or may not serve as a basis for liability will
have a significant impact on securities regulation and, consequently, the
market as a whole. A recent split between the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit provides a vivid example of the implications of a court’s decision in
the securities realm.8 This split concerns whether a violation of Item 303
may serve as a basis for liability under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19349 and SEC Rule 10b-5.10
Deciding whether a violation of Item 303 is actionable under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will have a great impact on a variety of players in the
securities markets.11 For example, the risk of liability will encourage
issuers to disclose thorough and adequate details concerning how “trends or
uncertainties could harm the issuer’s financial condition.”12 In making this
decision, however, it also is important to consider what safeguards are in
place to protect against a flood of information and (unnecessary)
litigation.13
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the development of securities
regulation and the specific regulations pertinent to this analysis. It also
analyzes the extent to which disclosure obligations achieve the goals
underlying their creation and how they have evolved to meet new issues. In
6. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 (May 24, 1989) [hereinafter
1989 SEC Release] (quoting Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed.
Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 SEC Release]).
7. However, critics of mandatory disclosure argue that voluntary disclosure, regulated
by market forces, is a much more efficient way of ensuring an optimal level of disclosure.
See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The
Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 689–91 (1999).
8. See generally Jonathan C. Dickey & Noah F. Stern, Creating a Clear Circuit Split,
the Second Circuit Holds That Failure to Disclose Known Trends or Uncertainties Under
Item 303 of Regulation S-K Creates Liability Under Section 10(b), GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
Second-Circuit--Failure-to-Disclose-Known-Trends-or-Uncertainties-Under-Item-303-Regulation%20S-K-Creates-Liability.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L6G-EZSQ].
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see infra Part II. Although recent literature has addressed
this issue, this Note will expand upon the issues and provide a unique perspective on
rationales that underlie this Note’s proposed resolution. See generally Denise Voigt
Crawford & Dean Galaro, A Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action for MD&A Violations?, 43
SEC. REG. L.J. 1 (2015).
11. See infra Part III.E.
12. See Dickey & Stern, supra note 8, at 4.
13. See Susanna M. Buergel, Andrew J. Ehrlich & Audra J. Soloway, Keeping Current:
Second Circuit Holds That Omissions Regarding “Known Trends” May Support a Section
10(b) Claim, but Imposes Limitations, BUS. L. TODAY 2 (Feb. 2015), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2015/02/full-issue-201502.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/KES7-LHPJ].
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addition, it explores the debate concerning whether mandatory disclosure is
the best way to regulate securities.14 While most agree that accurate
information is crucial to the decision-making process, there is some dispute
as to whether mandatory disclosure is the best way to provide investors
with the optimal amount. Finally, it discusses a few of the regulations that
play an important role in the circuit split discussed in Part II.
Part II then examines a recent conflict that has arisen among circuit
courts. Specifically, this part discusses whether a failure to comply with a
disclosure requirement created by Item 303 provides a basis for liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The two circuits to squarely address
this issue have reached opposite conclusions. This part details the
rationales offered by each decision, as well as how the courts have applied
those rationales to the facts of each case.
Part III of this Note explains why the U.S. Supreme Court should endorse
the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley15
that a violation of Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability under Rule
10b-5. First, it examines the materiality requirements of Item 303 and Rule
10b-5, independent of the two main cases. Next, it discusses why the
Second Circuit appropriately interpreted and applied the relevant precedent.
Finally, it explores the impact that such liability will have on the various
players of the securities markets, including the companies that produce the
information and the investors who rely on it.
I. SECURITIES REGULATION:
DEVELOPMENT, DISCLOSURE, AND DECREES
This Note begins by discussing the evolution of the securities regime
implemented in the United States. Part I.A explores the evolution of
mandatory disclosures and securities regulations more generally. Next, Part
I.B briefly discusses some of the key arguments made in the debate
surrounding the use of disclosure obligations. Finally, Part I.C takes a
closer look at several regulations examined by the Ninth Circuit and the
Second Circuit in resolving the conflict described in Part II.
A. Emergence of Disclosure Regulations
Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government decided to use disclosure
as the primary means of regulating the securities markets. Over time,
although the specifics of various regulations have changed, the basic
concept of using mandatory disclosure has remained the touchstone of this
regime. This section will examine the development of securities law and
the policies behind its implementation.

14. This includes whether, or to what extent, disclosure obligations protect investors and
promote an efficient market.
15. 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015).
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1. 1934–1960s: Creation and Implementation
The stock market crash of October 1929 and the ensuing depression
prompted calls for reform from the government and society as a whole.16
The years leading up to this crash were filled with “general prosperity,”
which motivated the first wave of “relatively unsophisticated small scale
investors” to enter the stock market.17 After the crash, Congress
determined that abuses in the securities markets, such as fraud and
deliberate manipulation of stock prices, were partially to blame.18 Thus,
one of Congress’s main priorities was to find a way to protect vulnerable
investors.19
Concluding that both state regulation and self-regulation were
ineffective, legislators began to direct their attention toward reform.20
Although many wanted a system based on government oversight, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt promoted a system based on disclosure.21 Not
only did disclosure impede illegal activity, but it “also tended to discourage
conduct which, although technically legal, was not entirely consistent with
the highest fiduciary standards of behavior.”22 In addition, this form of
regulation required limited government intervention.23
These ideas were articulated in Congress’s enactment of the Securities
Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“the 1934 Act”). The 1933 Act established requirements pertaining to the
issuance of new securities.24 Barring a specific exemption, a new security
could be offered for sale only after the offeror filed a registration statement
with the SEC and such statement became effective.25 The SEC, however,
had no authority to evaluate the quality of the underlying securities.26 If the
registration statement contained the required information, and this
information was not inadequate or misleading, it became effective at the
end of the twenty-day waiting period.27 After the registration statement

16. Alison G. Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A
Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 316–17 (1974).
17. Id. at 316.
18. See id. at 316–17.
19. See id. (noting that many small investors had been financially harmed by their
investments).
20. See id. at 318.
21. See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 132 (1973).
22. Anderson, supra note 16, at 319.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 321.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 322. In fact, the 1933 Act made it a crime for the SEC to comment on the
merits or truthfulness of a registration statement or offered security. See id. at 322 n.50.
27. See id. at 322. Although the statute listed specific requirements, it also gave the SEC
broad discretion to vary these requirements. Id.
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became effective, the registrant could begin to sell securities, but was
required to send a detailed prospectus28 to all purchasers.29
The 1933 Act also was designed to regulate transactions within the
securities markets.30 In addition to providing explicit prohibitions on
certain actions, the 1933 Act created private remedies for individuals who
bought securities from sellers who failed to provide proper disclosure or
Legislators hoped that these rules
used deceptive statements.31
simultaneously would increase the amount of accurate and useful
information in the marketplace and protect against fraud.32
The 1934 Act was intended to extend the regulations of the 1933 Act to
existing securities.33 Issuers of preexisting securities were required to
register these securities with the SEC and, in addition, file periodic reports
to ensure the information remained current.34 Although issuers were not
required to send these periodic reports directly to investors, proponents of a
mandatory disclosure system believed that small investors would still
benefit from such disclosure.35 Despite recognizing that average investors
would not be able to effectively utilize the detailed information in these
disclosures, proponents believed that investors would benefit from the
advice given and decisions made by those who could use the information
effectively.36
It was immediately apparent, however, that these statutes were not well
suited to protect small investors.37 Despite Congress’s hope, these
regulations were better equipped to disseminate information than to protect
unsophisticated investors.38 Although these regulations increased the
accessibility of reliable information, this information was not ideal for
efficient investment analysis.39 Those who wished to comply often were
stymied by “uncertain rules and ad hoc pronouncements,” which resulted in
In addition, issuers often
unhelpful “boilerplate” disclosures.40

28. Id. As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the term “prospectus” describes
“documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders.”
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995).
29. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 322. This prospectus was to contain all of the
information that was in the registration statement.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171–72 (1933) (noting that a “slow educational process” must take
place before the novice investors can benefit from these disclosures).
32. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 323.
33. Id. at 327.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 328–30.
36. See id. at 329–30. It was believed that this effective use of information would result
in more accurate market prices.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 321.
39. See id. at 342; see also Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS.
LAW. 631, 632 (1973) (arguing that some disclosures were too sophisticated for the layman,
yet too elementary to be useful for experts).
40. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 342.
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promulgated unnecessarily pessimistic disclosures, with the hope of
protecting against the unrealistic expectations advertised by promoters.41
2. 1964: Expansion
In 1964, the reach of the 1934 Act was expanded to cover the over-thecounter market.42 This greatly enhanced the SEC’s ability to protect
investors in the arena where most securities transactions took place: the
trading markets.43 Before this expansion, the SEC’s ability to enact strict
disclosure regulations was limited by the ability of companies to avoid
compliance by simply delisting.44
Although many government officials still advocated for protecting the
novice investor from fraud, focus began to shift toward making required
disclosure more useful for sophisticated investment analysis.45 As the
securities markets became increasingly complicated, the demand for
professional analysts and financial managers increased.46 At the same time,
the demand for more sophisticated information also increased.47 One way
the SEC accommodated the latter demand was to relax some of the
“stringent requirements that disclosure be negative in tone and limited to
‘hard facts.’”48
The goal of protecting the small investor, however, was not totally
abandoned. Issuers consistently were urged to make changes to their
prospectuses, such as reducing length and complexity, to make them more
palatable to unsophisticated traders.49 In addition, issuers were required to
put summaries in each prospectus to help protect investors from making bad
investments.50 While simplifying these disclosures may have benefited
novice investors, it also may have made these disclosures less useful to
experts.51
3. 1982: Integration
For over forty years, the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act were administered
independently, which resulted in duplicative obligations that were required

41. See id.
42. Id. at 343; see also Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1340, 1341 (1966) (discussing how the 1964 amendments made the disclosure
requirements of the 1934 Act “applicable to a much larger category of issuers”).
43. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 343.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 343–44.
46. See id. at 343.
47. See id.
48. See id. “Hard Facts” are the opposite of “soft information.” Id. at 337–38. “Soft
information” constitutes information that is not “susceptible [to] objective verification,” such
as statements about the future. Id. at 337 n.126 (citing Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and
Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972)).
49. See id. at 351.
50. See id. at 351–52.
51. See Kripke, supra note 39, at 632.
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to be satisfied in different ways.52 Thus, during the 1970s, the SEC began
focusing its attention on developing an integrated system that would reduce
redundancy and foster consistency.53
Regulation S-K was implemented as part of this integrated disclosure
system and contains many “substantive disclosure requirements,” including
Item 303.54 Specifically, Regulation S-K contains the requirements for the
nonfinancial disclosures contained in documents filed with the SEC.55
While the amount of detail required by Regulation S-K may seem
overwhelming, it is qualified by the concept of materiality.56
4. Recent Regulations:
Highlighting a Recurring Pattern
Throughout history, financial crises have been catalysts for significant
reforms.57 One such reform is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200258
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”), which was enacted in response to major scandals, such
as those involving Enron and WorldCom.59 Congress hoped that this
legislation would “restore investor confidence by improving corporate
financial reporting.”60 Congress’s approach, however, was unique in that
the focus was not disclosure obligations but, rather, substantive
regulations.61
Soon after Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, however, the U.S.
economy experienced the most devastating crisis since the Great
Depression.62 To protect against another such depression, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
52. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate
over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1158 (1995).
53. See id.
54. See STAFF OF THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K 8–10 (Dec. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU5C-CDEK].
55. Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC Is Riding Off in Two Directions at
Once 4 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 419, 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2650719&download=yes [https://perma.cc/6C
R5-2R8J].
56. See id. at 4–5. Materiality plays an important role in the circuit split that is the focus
of this Note and is discussed in further detail below.
57. See id. at 6.
58. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
59. See Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 229, 235 (2009); Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the SarbanesOxley Act: A Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 831 (2007).
60. Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2007) (quoting JOHN
BOSTLEMAN, Background: Twelve Months Leading Up to the SOA, in THE SARBANESOXLEY DESKBOOK 2–32 (2004)). Another major goal of Sarbanes-Oxley, the protection of
whistleblowers, see id., is not discussed in this Note.
61. See Romano, supra note 59, at 232 (noting that only a limited number of provisions
in Sarbanes-Oxley contained disclosure requirements).
62. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON
REG. 91, 92 (2012).
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Act63 (“Dodd-Frank”). Dodd-Frank changed the way institutions were
supervised by considering the functions of each institution rather than the
specified corporate form.64 In addition, Dodd-Frank instituted new
agencies to collect data and ensure transparency throughout financial
markets.65 However, before the SEC was able to execute fully the
expansive regulations required under Dodd-Frank, Congress passed the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act66 (“JOBS Act”). Unlike SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank, the JOBS Act reduced the number of requirements
imposed on certain companies.67
This brief, partial history is meant to illustrate a pattern of “episodic
expansion of regulatory scope within the disclosure regime.”68 The next
section of this Note explores a debate that often accompanies these reforms.
B. Why Disclose at All?
Even though disclosure remains the focus of securities regulation, the
debate surrounding its use is still thriving. Not only are there questions
about mandatory disclosure generally, but there are also disputes about
what level of disclosure is most efficient.69 This section briefly highlights
some of the arguments on both sides of this contentious debate.
As previously discussed, disclosure rules were implemented with a
variety of policy goals in mind.70 A few of the main justifications for such
rules are encouraging confidence in the markets, protecting unsophisticated
investors, and ensuring investors receive adequate and accurate
information.71 By increasing the supply of accurate information, mandatory
disclosure promotes efficiency and profitability throughout the securities
markets.72
Since information has many qualities of a public good,73 it tends to be
underprovided and not adequately verified.74 Thus, it is argued that
mandatory disclosure is needed to prevent companies from trying to avoid

63. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
64. See Barr, supra note 62, at 92.
65. See id.
66. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
67. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the Federalist
Society’s Panelist Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act,” 38 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 453, 454 (2013).
68. Romano, supra note 59, at 231.
69. See White, supra note 1.
70. See supra Part I.A.1.
71. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692–96 (1984). Easterbrook and Fischel find these
rationales unconvincing and present alternative justifications, including protecting against
interstate exploitation and limiting the costs of a common law system. See id. at 696–99.
72. See id. at 673.
73. A public good is a good from which others can consume and benefit, whether or not
they contributed to the costs of acquiring it. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984).
74. See id. at 722.
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liability by simply staying silent.75 Mandatory disclosure also reduces the
fear that rivals will get a “free ride” or a “competitive advantage” from such
disclosure.76 In addition, since those who spend the time and resources to
thoroughly evaluate a potential investment tend to be undercompensated, a
regulatory response may be justified to correct the market’s failure to
produce the “socially optimal supply of research.”77
Those in favor of mandatory disclosure also argue that fostering
collectivization helps minimize social waste caused by investors
misallocating resources in pursuit of trading gains.78 This collectivization
also helps preserve resources by protecting against unnecessary
duplication.79 Rather than duplicating research, these resources could be
used in other ways, such as expanding investment.80
There is, however, some debate over whether mandatory disclosure rules
are necessary to facilitate the spread of information.81 One argument is that
the best disclosure policy is the one utilized by corporations in the absence
of regulations.82 If disclosure will assist investors, then the company will
do so because it will lead to increased profits.83
There also are arguments that mandatory disclosure is not necessary to
combat the free rider problem discussed above.84 Although others benefit
from the efforts put forth by informed traders,85 these efforts do not go
unrewarded. There are benefits, such as discounts on accurate valuations,
available to those who first acquire information.86
In addition, there are concerns that too many disclosure requirements
might actually hurt the market by forfeiting quality for quantity.87 As the
amount of detail required to satisfy disclosure obligations increases,
investors may be so inundated with information that they are unable to
accurately ascertain what information is relevant.88

75. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 680.
76. See id. at 686.
77. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 73, at 725–28.
78. See id. at 722.
79. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 682.
80. See id. at 675.
81. See id. at 680–85.
82. See Benston, supra note 21, at 133. One rebuttal to this, however, is that it “assumes
much too facilely that manager and shareholder interests can be perfectly aligned.” Coffee,
Jr., supra note 73, at 722.
83. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 682.
84. See id. at 694.
85. These efforts will be reflected in the market prices, which fluctuate until they
adequately represent the information known at that time. See id.
86. See id. Becuase mandatory disclosure will still not provide the passive investors
with the information in time to benefit from these bargains, it is argued that another rationale
is needed to promote this policy. See id.
87. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
88. See White, supra note 1.
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C. Relevant Rules and Regulations
This part examines several rules and regulations that play a significant
role in the conflict discussed in Part II. Part I.C.1 discusses section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. It also examines the different components of claims
brought under Rule 10b-5, focusing particularly on materiality. Part I.C.2
briefly discusses sections 11 and 12(a)(2), which are pertinent to the
analysis of the circuit split discussed in Part II. Finally, Part I.C.3 analyzes
Item 303. Specifically, it examines the textual requirements, as well as
SEC guidance on how to meet those requirements.
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Under section 10(b), it is illegal “[t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.”89 As noted by the Supreme Court, this section
was intended to be a comprehensive provision that protected against a
variety of deceptive practices, including fraud.90 This section also endows
the SEC with the power to prohibit such conduct in securities
transactions.91
Consequently, the SEC implemented section 10(b) via Rule 10b-5, which
states that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.92

In order to bring a successful Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must establish
six elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”93
While explicit misstatements are relatively easy to identify, it is more
difficult to determine whether a company’s silence may expose it to
liability. The Supreme Court shed some light on this issue by declaring that
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
90. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203–04 (1976).
91. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
93. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
This Note focuses on the first element, while briefly discussing the other five.
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“[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”94
It did not, however, explicitly describe what was required to create a duty to
disclose.95 Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 creates an
affirmative obligation to disclose all material information, disclosure is
required when “a material fact [is] necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.”96
A key term in the first element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is “materiality.”97
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,98 the Supreme Court clarified the materiality
standard for Rule 10b-5 by explicitly stating that “an omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”99 Basic also clarified
that, if information is speculative or contingent, materiality depends on
“both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”100
The Supreme Court, however, also warned against treating investors like
children who are unable to comprehend the probable consequences of
typical business interactions.101 It was concerned that if companies started
overdisclosing to protect against liability, the rule would end up harming
the very investors it was designed to protect.102 Thus, to prevent the rule
from generating too great of an influx of information, the Supreme Court
explicitly stated that it was “careful not to set too low a standard of
materiality.”103
The other contours of the remaining five elements similarly have been
defined through jurisprudence. For example, the scienter requirement of
Rule 10b-5 has been read by most courts to require that the defendant
knowingly or recklessly disseminated a disclosure that was false or
misleading.104 The dominant approach to analyzing recklessness is to apply
a subjective standard.105 The Supreme Court also confirmed that to bring a
private action under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must have actually bought or

94. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
95. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
97. See id.
98. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
99. Id. at 231. This language was taken from another Supreme Court case that arose
under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
100. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849
(2d Cir. 1968)).
101. See id. at 234.
102. See id. at 231.
103. Id.
104. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 101, 126 (1997).
105. See id. at 126 n.83 (“There must be some awareness of the risk that the disclosure is
false or misleading, not simply an extreme departure from the standard of care.”).
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sold securities.106 With regard to reliance, the Supreme Court has applied
the fraud-on-the-market theory.107 This theory is based on the assumption
that investors who purchase securities rely on the integrity of market prices,
which reflect most publicly available information.108 Thus, in a Rule 10b-5
action, it may be presumed that these investors relied on public disclosures
that contained material misrepresentations or omissions.109 Finally, to
bring a successful action under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must also establish
“that the defendant’s deceptive conduct caused their claimed economic
loss.”110
Although Rule 10b-5 does not expressly provide for a private right of
action, courts have crafted an implied right of recovery for individual
investors.111 Damages in these cases mostly have consisted of actual
damages, rescission, and injunctive relief.112
2. Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act
In analyzing the connection between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5, the Ninth
Circuit and the Second Circuit disagree over whether it is appropriate to
consider the relationship between Item 303 and sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of
the 1933 Act.113
Although sections 11 and 12(a)(2) establish bases for liability in
connection with the purchase of securities, each rule is limited in scope to
specific types of transactions.114 While section 11 applies to sales of
securities in connection with public offerings, section 12(a)(2) covers
transactions made via instruments of interstate commerce.115 Although the
requirements for claims brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) are not
identical to those brought under Rule 10b-5, there is some overlap—the
most significant being the focus on materiality.116
Both section 11 and section 12(a)(2) state that disclosure of untrue
material statements constitutes a basis for liability.117 In addition, both
sections impose liability for omissions of material facts necessary to
prevent disclosed statements from becoming misleading.118 Not only is the
language similar to that of Rule 10b-5, but courts also have applied the
106. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (noting
desire to prevent “vexatious litigation” as one of its rationales).
107. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 229.
108. See id. at 245.
109. See id. at 246–47.
110. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 807 (2011).
111. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 733,
735 (1971). The first decision to find an implied right of action was Kardon v. Nat’l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2012); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969).
113. See infra Part II.
114. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2).
115. See id.
116. See supra Part I.C.1.
117. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2).
118. See id.
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same standard for materiality in all three causes of action.119 However, a
defendant will not be liable if it can prove that the purchaser was aware of
the material untruth or omission.120.
Unlike Rule 10b-5, these rules explicitly establish private rights of
action.121 However, both provisions are limited in scope and impose
stringent liability standards.122 In addition, plaintiffs alleging violations
under either section 11 or 12(a)(2) do not have to prove scienter, reliance,
or causation of damages.123
3. Item 303: Management’s Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
Item 303 states that the registrant will “[d]escribe any known trends or
uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will
have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or
income from continuing operations.”124 Instruction 3 to this paragraph
states that “[t]he discussion and analysis shall focus specifically on material
events and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating
results or of future financial condition.”125 This disclosure is called
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A).
The SEC later clarified that there is an affirmative duty to disclose when
“a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently
known to management and reasonably likely to have material effects on the
registrant’s financial condition or results of operation.”126 In these
situations, companies should, and may even be obligated to, provide more
than just a simple a discussion. Instead, companies should provide a
detailed analysis of the pertinent information.127 However, the SEC has
cautioned that this obligation requires “quantitative information” only when
it is “reasonably available and will provide material information for
investors.”128

119. See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004)).
120. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2).
121. See id.
122. Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)
(noting that these sections “impose[] strict liability on issuers and signatories, and negligence
liability on underwriters”).
123. Id.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016).
125. Id. § 229.303(a), Instruction 3.
126. 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,429.
127. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operation, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange
Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC
Release].
128. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 2003
SEC Release, supra note 127, at 75,065).
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The SEC also clarified that the test for materiality under Item 303
requires a two-step process.129 First, if management decides that the
“known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty”130 is not
“reasonably likely to occur,” then they need not disclose.131 The key phrase
to this part of the analysis is “reasonably likely to occur.” While no specific
percentage is given, it is a less demanding standard than “more likely than
not.”132 Thus, this part of the test sets a low bar for disclosure; if a trend is
reasonably likely to occur, it must be disclosed.
The second part of the test provides a contingency plan for when
management is unable to make the determination that the trend is not
reasonably likely to occur.133
If management cannot make such
determination, it must assume that the trend will occur and objectively
evaluate its consequences.134 Management must disclose this trend unless
it “determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or
results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.”135
Despite this guidance from the SEC, the requirements under this section
are flexible and complicated, leaving the company with a difficult task.136
Item 303 disclosures are intended to provide investors with a unique view
of the registrant.137 By providing investors with this perspective, it
provides context that will assist in understanding where a company is
headed and whether it would be a wise investment.138 The SEC long has
viewed a narrative explaining the disclosed financial statements as crucial
to investor analysis of how indicative past performance is of the future
success of the company.139
To ensure compliance, however, it is important to implement effective
enforcement mechanisms.140 Although Item 303 does not explicitly
provide for a private cause of action, the SEC has other means by which to
compel compliance.141 For example, the SEC has the ability to enter cease

129. See 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6.
130. For the remainder of this Note, these terms will collectively be referred to as “trend.”
131. See 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6, at 22,430.
132. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296, 6302 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (“To be ‘reasonably likely’ a
material violation must be more than a mere possibility, but it need not be ‘more likely than
not.’”).
133. See 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6, at 22,430.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477, 478
(1994).
137. See 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,436 (“[T]he general purpose of the
MD&A requirements [is] to give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through
the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective analysis of the registrant’s
financial condition and results of operations, with particular emphasis on the registrant’s
prospects for the future.”).
138. See id.
139. See 1987 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 13,717.
140. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000) (noting the importance of enforcing prohibitions against fraud).
141. See Croft, supra note 136, at 498–99.
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and desist orders against a company that files a deficient MD&A.142 Not
only is this a way to enforce rules promulgated by the SEC, but it also
provides another avenue for the SEC to provide guidance to companies on
how to adhere to its regulations.143
For example, the SEC’s In re Caterpillar144 called upon the company to
cease and desist from any action that resulted in a violation of the MD&A
requirements.145 In addition, the company was required to “implement and
maintain procedures designed to ensure compliance with Item 303.”146 The
SEC found the company’s procedures to be inadequate, despite the fact that
the MD&A in dispute was reviewed by several of the company’s officers,
including the treasurer, legal counsel, and accounting department.147
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER VIOLATIONS OF ITEM 303
MAY SERVE AS A BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5
Part II of this Note examines the question of whether failure to comply
with a disclosure requirement created by Item 303 can provide a basis for
liability under Rule 10b-5. Part II.A discusses three cases, a Third Circuit
decision and two Second Circuit decisions, analyzed by the Ninth Circuit
and the Second Circuit in reaching their conflicting conclusions. Part II.B
thoroughly examines a subsequent Ninth Circuit case, where the court
considered whether violating Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability
under Rule 10b-5. Then, Part II.C discusses the Second Circuit’s analysis
of the same question, including its critique of the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
Finally, Part II.D briefly summarizes the competing arguments articulated
in this circuit split.
A. Paving the Road for the Rulings:
Qualification and Analogy
This section discusses the three main cases examined by both the Ninth
Circuit and the Second Circuit in reaching their conflicting conclusions.
1. Oran v. Stafford: Leaving the Door Ajar
In Oran v. Stafford,148 the plaintiff stockholders alleged that American
Home Products Corporation (AHP) “made material misrepresentations and
omissions” concerning the safety of the prescription drugs that they
142. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar.
31, 1992). This was the first time the SEC used its new powers to require companies to
cease and desist from actions that constituted violations of certain regulations. See Croft,
supra note 136, at 504.
143. See Caterpillar, 50 S.E.C. at 912 (noting specific reasons why the MD&A in
question was deficient).
144. Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar. 31, 1992).
145. See id. at 913.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 907.
148. 226 F.3d 275 (3rd Cir. 2000). Then-Judge Samuel A. Alito authored the majority
opinion for the Third Circuit.
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Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed that they
manufactured.149
experienced a significant financial loss when AHP’s stock price dropped
following the disclosure of this previously withheld information.150
After the district court dismissed the complaint, the plaintiffs appealed
and argued, among other things, that AHP violated Item 303, and such
violation served as a basis for liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.151 The Third Circuit held that in order for the plaintiffs to succeed,
they had to establish that Item 303 “creates an independent private right of
action, or that the regulation imposes an affirmative duty of disclosure on
AHP that, if violated, would constitute a material omission under Rule
10b-5.”152
After explicitly holding that Item 303 does not create an independent
private cause of action, the Third Circuit analyzed whether Item 303 creates
an affirmative duty to disclose material information.153 In evaluating this
argument, it examined whether Item 303 disclosure is regulated in a manner
consistent with the standards imposed by the Supreme Court for private
fraud actions.154 Finding that the materiality standards for Rule 10b-5
“differ significantly” from those for Item 303,155 the Third Circuit stated:
“[D]emonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303
does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be
required under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be separately
shown.”156
Thus, Oran held “that a violation of [Item 303’s] reporting requirements
does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.
Because plaintiffs have failed to plead any actionable misrepresentation or
omission under that Rule, [Item 303] cannot provide a basis for liability.”157
Both the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit would subsequently rely on this
case, and particularly this phrase, to justify their conflicting conclusions.158
2. Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P.
In Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P.,159 the Second Circuit analyzed
whether violations of Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability under
149. Id. at 279. The plaintiffs claimed that AHP failed to disclose that there were several
studies that linked these drugs, Pondimin and Redux, to heart-valve damage. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 281.
152. Id. at 287.
153. See id. at 287–88.
154. The Third Circuit compared the SEC’s interpretation of the disclosure obligations
created by Item 303 with the general securities fraud materiality standard established by the
Supreme Court in Basic. See id.
155. According to the SEC, “the probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by
the Supreme Court in Basic . . . is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.” See 1989 SEC Release,
supra note 6, at 22,430 n.27.
156. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (quoting Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608
(N.D. Cal. 1991)).
157. Id.
158. See infra Part II.B–C.
159. 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011).
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sections 11 and 12(a)(2). Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with
the Second Circuit on the outcome of Litwin, the courts disagreed over
whether the analysis therein was applicable to understanding the connection
between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5.
In this case, the plaintiffs160 alleged that the defendants161 violated
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act by both omitting and affirmatively
misstating material information in the company’s initial public offering
registration statement and prospectus.162 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants were aware of, and failed to disclose, problems relating to
certain portfolio companies and investments that the company should have
reasonably expected to have material effects on its future revenues.163
Plaintiffs contended that because the defendants were obligated to disclose
this information under Item 303, failure to do so provided the basis for
liability.164
The Second Circuit noted that, to promote compliance with disclosure
obligations, section 11 places a low burden on the plaintiff.165 The focus
then shifted to the legal standard for materiality, which is stated to be the
same as that for Rule 10b-5 claims.166 After citing the standard for
materiality laid out in Basic,167 the court reaffirmed its rejection of a
formulaic approach to materiality analysis.168 It also noted that this
analysis is a fact-based inquiry that must include assessment of both
qualitative and quantitative factors.169
In analyzing the materiality of the defendants’ alleged omissions and
misstatements, the Second Circuit focused on several factors. First,
although the fact that information is publicly available is relevant, it is not
dispositive.170 While certain events pertaining to the defendants’ company
were publicly known, the potential impact of those events on the future of
the company was not.171 Second, the court rejected the defendants’ use of a
balancing test to avoid disclosure of material events that have negative

160. The plaintiffs in this class action were all individuals who purchased shares of the
defendant corporation at the time of its initial public offering. See id. at 708.
161. The defendants were Blackstone Group, L.P. and several of its executives. Id. at
708–09.
162. Id. at 708.
163. Id. at 710.
164. Id. at 716.
165. Id. (quoting Herman & Mac-Lean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1983)).
166. Id. at 717 n.10.
167. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
168. Litwin, 634 F.3d at 717.
169. Id. (citing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19,
1999)). With respect to quantitative factors, the SEC suggested using a 5 percent deviation
as a benchmark. Any disclosure that deviated from the actual value by less than 5 percent
most likely would not be material. However, this may not be the case if the disclosure
concerned was qualitatively significant. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 45,152.
170. Litwin, 634 F.3d at 718.
171. Id. at 718–19.
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effects.172 With regard to the qualitative analysis, the Second Circuit
considered whether the misstatement or omission was related to a
significant part of the company’s business.173
Third, the Second Circuit addressed the defendants’ concern that a broad
interpretation of materiality would result in investors being buried with
information, sacrificing quality for quantity.174 Conceding that the SEC
prohibits this influx of information, the court pointed to certain protections
that quelled this concern.175 Specifically, for omissions to serve as a basis
for liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2), the omitted information must be
material and the company must have a duty to disclose.176 Thus, the court
held that the combination of these requirements provides sufficient
protection from the threat of overdisclosure.
3. Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc.
In Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc.,177 the Second
Circuit again analyzed whether violations of Item 303 may serve as a basis
for liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2).178 Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant179 failed to disclose a known defect in a major
product in both its registration statement and the prospectus for its
secondary offering.180 Despite knowing the large scale of the defect, the
defendant chose not to disclose particulars, but rather it issued a generic
warning about the risks associated with selling complex products.181 Thus,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated Item 303 by failing to
disclose this “known . . . uncertaint[y].”182
In its analysis, the Second Circuit noted that omissions may serve as a
basis for liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) if a company has an
affirmative legal obligation to disclose.183 It then explicitly stated that the
duty to disclose under Item 303 constituted such an obligation.184 The
Second Circuit also explained that analysis of Item 303 violations was
172. Id. at 719. The defendants tried to claim that the information in dispute was not
material because the loss was offset by gains in other parts of the company. The SEC also
rejected this aggregation approach, concluding that each misstatement or omission should be
considered independently. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,153.
173. Litwin, 634 F.3d at 720 (noting that the importance of the business segment being
discussed is directly correlated to the likelihood that such disclosure is material).
174. Id. at 722.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 722–23.
177. 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2012).
178. Id. at 116. Although the plaintiffs also alleged violations of section 15 of the 1933
Act, this Note does not discuss those allegations.
179. The defendant company produced semiconductors used by original equipment
manufacturers in the communications industry. Id.
180. Id. at 116–17. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant became aware of this defect
after receiving complaints from two of its largest customers. Id. at 116.
181. Id. at 117. Three months after the secondary offering, the defendant issued a recall
of this defective product, which resulted in a $2.2 million net loss. Id.
182. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016)).
183. Id. at 120.
184. Id.
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similar to a materiality analysis in that neither relies on “restrictive
mechanical or quantitative inquiries.”185
The Second Circuit relied on two critical factual allegations to vacate the
district court’s denial of leave to amend. First, the defective product was
sold to customers representing 72 percent of the defendant’s revenues.186
Second, the company would be unable to easily ascertain exactly which
products contained the defects.187 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that
even though the precise magnitude of the harm was not known at the time
the offering documents were released, it is plausible that the defendants
were aware of an “uncertainty” that was “reasonably expected” to have a
negative material impact on the company.188
B. The Ninth Circuit: Closing the Door to Liability
In the Ninth Circuit’s In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation,189 the
court held that violating Item 303’s duty to disclose cannot provide a basis
for liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.190 In reaching this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on both case law and SEC
statements.191
Plaintiffs brought this case after the share price of NVIDIA
Corporation192 dropped 31 percent, decreasing its market capitalization by
$3 billion.193 This loss occurred after NVIDIA filed an 8-K in July 2008,
disclosing that the company would need to take “a $150 to $200 million
charge to cover warranty, repair, return, replacement, and other costs,”
resulting from defects in certain MCP194 and GPU195 products.196
According to the plaintiffs,197 however, NVIDIA knew about the defects
in its products, and the potential for liability, several months before this
disclosure.198 Plaintiffs further alleged that this information was material to
investors and should have been disclosed.199 Because NVIDIA failed to do
so, other statements contained in these filings were misleading in violation
185. Id. at 122.
186. See id. at 121.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014).
190. See id. at 1056.
191. See id. at 1054–56.
192. NVIDIA, a publicly traded company, produced semiconductors. Id. at 1048.
193. See id. at 1051.
194. MCPs are media and communications processors, which combine the functions of
various devices, such as GPUs and audio signal processors. See id. at 1048.
195. GPUs are graphics processing units, which process the data required for rendering
images on a computer. See id.
196. Id. at 1050.
197. The plaintiffs in this case consisted of a class of stockholders who purchased stock in
NVIDIA during the class period: November 8, 2007 through July 2, 2008. Id. at 1051.
198. See id. at 1048. According to the complaint, NVIDIA began experiencing problems
in September 2006. See id. at 1049. At that time, NVIDIA began making changes to these
products and working with some of its customers to determine the cause of the defects. See
id. at 1049–50.
199. Id. at 1051.
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of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.200 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended
that because Item 303 creates a duty to disclose certain material
information, failure to do so violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.201
The court, noting that this was a matter of first impression in the Ninth
Circuit, held that “Item 303’s disclosure duty is [not] actionable under
[s]ection 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”202 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit considered its own precedent203 and the Third Circuit’s decision in
Oran.204 Focusing on the fact that the materiality standards for Rule 10b-5
“differ significantly” from those for Item 303, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that this difference precluded Item 303 violations from serving as a basis
for liability under Rule 10b-5.205
In addition, the Ninth Circuit rejected the comparison of Rule 10b-5 to
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.206 It noted that unlike
Rule 10b-5, liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) arises from a failure to
comply with an affirmative duty to disclose.207 Further, plaintiffs are not
required to prove scienter in section 11 or section 12(a)(2) claims.208 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit found NVIDIA distinguishable from Litwin and Panther
Partners.209
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on
Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp.210 In Simon, the District Court
of Rhode Island noted that Item 303 does create a disclosure obligation and
that the defendant’s failure to disclose created a basis for liability.211 The
Ninth Circuit, however, pointed out that the District Court of Rhode Island
later clarified Simon and held that a violation of Item 303, without more,
does not establish that defendants violated Rule 10b-5.212

200. Id. at 1048, 1051. The plaintiffs pointed to a number of filings to illustrate this
claim, including an 8-K filed on February 13, 2008, which asserted: “Fiscal 2008 was
another outstanding and record year for us. Strong demand for GPUs in all market segments
drove our growth.” Id. at 1050.
201. Id. at 1054.
202. Id.
203. See id. (citing In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993)) (noting
that because forecasts are addressed in a separate SEC regulation, such statements need not
be disclosed under Item 303 and thus do not serve as a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5);
In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing between “known trends or uncertainties,” which must be disclosed under
Item 303, and forecasts, which need not be disclosed under Item 303); In re Convergent
Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that forecasts need not be
disclosed under Item 303).
204. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1054–55; see also supra Part II.A.1.
205. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1055.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1056.
209. See id. at 1055–56. For a detailed discussion of these two cases, see supra Part
II.A.2–3.
210. 945 F. Supp. 416 (D.R.I. 1996); see NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1056.
211. See Simon, 945 F. Supp. at 431.
212. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1056 (citing Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F.
Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D.R.I. 2002)).
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After considering these cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Item 303
does not establish a duty to disclose that can create liability under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.213 Creating liability under Rule 10b-5 requires that
plaintiffs establish a separate duty to disclose.214 The Ninth Circuit also
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead a strong inference of scienter
and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the amended complaint.215
C. The Second Circuit: Rejecting NVIDIA
and Opening the Door to Liability
In Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley,216 the Second Circuit held that
violating the disclosure requirements established by Item 303 may serve as
a basis for liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5).217 It qualified
this holding, however, by noting that such a violation can create liability
only “if the allegedly omitted information satisfies Basic’s test for
materiality,” and the plaintiff satisfies all of the other requirements
necessary to sustain a 10b-5 action.218
In Stratte-McClure, the plaintiffs219 claimed that the defendants220 “made
material misstatements and omissions between June 20, 2007 and
November 19, 2007 (the class period) in an effort to conceal Morgan
Stanley’s exposure to and losses from the subprime mortgage market.”221
Consequently, the plaintiffs alleged that they “suffered substantial financial
loss” when Morgan Stanley’s stock price dropped after the truth was
publicly disclosed.222
This case centered on a “massive proprietary trade” executed by the
defendants in December 2006.223 In this trade, the defendants were
essentially “betting that defaults in the subprime mortgage markets would
be significant enough to impair the value of the higher-risk collateralized
debt obligations (CDO) tranches referenced by the Short Position,[224] but
not significant enough to impair the value of the lower-risk CDOs tranches
referenced by the Long Position.”225
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1055.
215. See id. at 1048, 1062.
216. 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015).
217. See id.
218. Id. at 103.
219. The plaintiffs were a class of investors, led by State-Boston Retirement System and
Fjarde AP-Fonden. Id. at 96.
220. The defendants were Morgan Stanley and six former and current officers. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 97.
224. In the “Short Position,” the credit default swaps (CDS), purchased by the defendant
on CDOs backed by mezzanine tranches of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS), functioned like insurance policies. In return for the payment of annual premiums,
the defendant received payments if these RMBSs defaulted or declined in value as a result of
a declining housing market. See id.
225. Id. In the “Long Position,” the defendant sold CDSs that were similar to the ones
purchased in the Short Position, but these CDSs were referenced by higher-rated, lower-risk
CDOs. Since the defendant was the seller in the Long Position, it received premiums in
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Although the defendants accurately predicted that the subprime mortgage
markets would decline, they underestimated the magnitude, which resulted
in a loss of billions of dollars.226 The plaintiffs contended that the
defendants made many material misstatements and omissions to conceal
their “exposure to and losses from” this transaction during the class
period.227
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley made material
omissions in its 10-Q filings by failing to disclose the losses sustained on
the “Long Position” in 2007 and that it was likely to suffer additional
substantial losses in the future.228 Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed, the
defendants violated the Item 303 obligation to disclose “known trends, or
uncertainties that have had, or might reasonably be expected to have,
a[n] . . . unfavorable material effect.”229
Noting that this was a matter of first impression in the Second Circuit,
the court concluded that an Item 303 violation may be actionable under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but only if the violation satisfies the
materiality standards established by Basic and all of the other requirements
necessary to sustain such action.230 In reaching this conclusion, it relied on
precedent, other sections of the 1933 Act, and scholarly commentary.
The Second Circuit noted that it consistently had held that an omission is
actionable only when there is a duty to disclose the omitted information.231
This duty to disclose may be created by insider trading violations, a statute
or regulation, or a statement that would be “inaccurate, incomplete, or
misleading” without additional disclosure.232 Agreeing with the plaintiffs,
the court found that Item 303 imposes an obligation to disclose “any known
trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant reasonably expects will have a
material . . . unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from continuing
operations.”233
After concluding that Item 303 creates an affirmative duty to disclose, the
Second Circuit noted that courts have historically recognized that Rule
10b-5 violations can be “derive[d] from statutes or regulations that obligate
a party to speak.”234 Because Item 303 requires these disclosures, an
investor could reasonably interpret silence as an implication that there are
exchange for the promise that it would distribute payments if these higher-rated CDOs
defaulted or declined in value. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 98. There were two categories of misrepresentations and omissions: those
regarding the defendant’s exposure to credit risk arising from the Long Position (“the
exposure claim”) and those regarding the losses from the Long Position (“the valuation
claim”). Id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 107–08.
231. See id. at 101. These holdings were the result of the Supreme Court’s conclusion
that if there is no duty to disclose, silence is not misleading under Rule 10b-5. See id. at 100–
01 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988)).
232. Id. at 101 (quoting Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990)).
233. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016)).
234. Id. at 102.
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no “known trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant reasonably expects
will have a material . . . unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from
continuing operations.”235 Thus, if such trends or uncertainties do exist,
silence may be misleading to investors.236
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that Item 303 and Rule 10b-5
have different materiality standards, it did not find these differences
significant enough to automatically preclude liability.237 Instead, it held
that, although Item 303 violations establish that a defendant has a duty to
disclose, a plaintiff must also establish that the omission was material under
Basic to be successful.238
The Second Circuit also compared Stratte-McClure to Litwin and
Panther Partners, where it held Item 303 violations to be actionable under
section 11 and section 12(a)(2).239 Noting the similarity in the language of
section 12(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5,240 it held that in both contexts, omitting
information required by Item 303 may mislead investors.241 Thus, because
Item 303 may create a duty to disclose under section 12(a)(2), the same is
true for claims brought under Rule 10b-5.242
Although the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs successfully had
alleged that the defendant violated the duty to disclose created by Item
303,243 it affirmed the dismissal of the claim because the plaintiffs failed to
adequately plead scienter.244
The Second Circuit also explicitly noted its disagreement with the Ninth
Circuit.245 Specifically, the Second Circuit found that the Ninth Circuit had
misinterpreted Oran and refuted the notion that Oran conclusively
established that violations of Item 303 are never actionable under Rule
10b-5.246 Instead, the Second Circuit found that Oran actually opened the
door to the possibility that such liability could be created in certain
situations.247 Noting that, at the very least, Oran is consistent with the
holding that Item 303 violations can establish liability under Rule 10b-5 if

235. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
236. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102.
237. See id. at 103.
238. See id.
239. See generally Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
2012); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011). For a discussion of
these cases see supra Part II.A.2–3.
240. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) (“Like
[s]ection 12(a)(2), Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of ‘material fact[s] necessary in order to
make . . . statements made . . . not misleading . . . .’”).
241. See id. at 104.
242. See id.
243. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that it satisfied its Item 303 obligations,
finding that its “disclosures about market trends were generic, spread out over several
different filings, and often unconnected to the company’s financial position.” Id. at 105.
244. See id. at 106.
245. See id. at 103.
246. See id.
247. See id. (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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the other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established and the omission
meets the Basic standard for materiality.248
In addition, the Second Circuit found that in NVIDIA, the Ninth Circuit
“misconstrue[d] the relationship between Rule 10b-5 and [s]ection
12(a)(2).”249 Although the Ninth Circuit previously followed the decision
in Panther Partners, it failed to note that both Rule 10b-5 and section
12(a)(2) have “textually identical” prohibitions on omissions.250 Thus, both
Panther Partners and Litwin are relevant to this issue and “provide firm
footing” for the Second Circuit’s conclusion.251
D. Summary of the Circuit Split
As noted in Stratte-McClure, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
are “at odds” regarding whether a violation of Item 303 is actionable under
Rule 10b-5.252 While both courts used Oran to support their conflicting
conclusions, they disagreed over the repercussions of the Third Circuit’s
determination that, due to the differing materiality standards of Item 303
and Rule 10b-5, a violation of Item 303 “does not automatically give rise to
a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”253 The Ninth Circuit found that this
statement supported an absolute bar to liability, while the Second Circuit
held that this language allowed for the possibility of liability in certain
situations.254
In addition, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit disagreed over
whether it was appropriate to analogize to cases brought under sections 11
and 12(a)(2). In Litwin and Panther Partners, the Second Circuit
“established that Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for the purposes of
liability under [s]ection 12(a)(2).”255 Relying on the fact that both section
12(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit omissions of material facts necessary to
make other statements not misleading, the Second Circuit found that Item
303 also could establish a duty to disclose for purposes of Rule 10b-5.256
The Ninth Circuit, however, despite adopting the conclusions of Litwin and
Panther Partners,257 found those decisions to be “irrelevant to its analysis
of Rule 10b-5.”258
Finally, it is worth noting that, despite these different conclusions, both
cases were dismissed, at least in part, because the plaintiffs failed to
adequately plead scienter.259

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 103.
Id.
See id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
See id.
See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104.
See id. at 106; In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014).

360

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
ADOPT STRATTE-MCCLURE
Part III of this Note argues that the Supreme Court should examine this
issue and adopt the Second Circuit’s conclusion that violations of Item 303
may create liability under Rule 10b-5, but only in instances where the other
elements of Rule 10b-5 have been satisfied and the omission or
misstatement meets the Basic standard for materiality. Part III.A discusses
the relationship between the materiality standards for Item 303 and Rule
10b-5. Part III.B presents and resolves several hypotheticals addressing the
different potential outcomes of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 analyses. Part
III.C discusses three cases underlying the Second Circuit’s analysis. Next,
Part III.D explains how the remedies for Item 303 violations and Rule
10b-5 claims support this conclusion. Finally, Part III.E describes how the
Second Circuit’s conclusion will impact various participants in the
securities markets.
A. Materiality: The Connection Between
Separate Standards and Related Roles
In rejecting the notion that Item 303 could provide a basis for liability
under 10b-5, the Ninth Circuit focused on the differing materiality
requirements.260 While the SEC did explicitly state that the Basic
materiality test was “inapposite to Item 303 disclosure,”261 that assertion
does not necessarily mean that there is no overlap between the two
standards.262 In certain instances, as illustrated by the scenarios below,
information may satisfy both Item 303’s and Rule 10b-5’s materiality
standards.263
Looking at both parts of the Item 303 materiality test promulgated by the
SEC,264 it becomes evident that probability is the driving factor.265 Even
though the second part of this test calls upon management to assume that a
trend will happen, the exception, which eliminates the obligation to
disclose, also is based on a probability analysis.266 Regardless of the
magnitude of the potential material effect on the registrant’s finances or
operations, if that effect is not reasonably likely to occur, it need not be
disclosed under Item 303.267 The Rule 10b-5 materiality standard,
however, incorporates both probability and magnitude.268 Under this test,
even an event that is not reasonably likely to occur might need to be
disclosed if its potential impact on the company is extreme.
260. NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1055.
261. 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,430 n.27.
262. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.
263. See infra Part III.B.
264. See supra Part I.C.3.
265. See generally 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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While this discrepancy supports the conclusion that an Item 303 violation
does not inevitably provide a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5, it does
not justify a complete bar against such liability.269 A proper analysis of the
relationship between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 should include two steps.
First, courts should analyze whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose the
information in question.270 Then, courts should conduct a separate analysis
to see if the information satisfies the materiality standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Basic.271 In situations where the information has a high
probability of occurring, failure to disclose will violate Item 303 and
simultaneously satisfy Rule 10b-5’s materiality requirement.
B. Hypotheticals: Relationship Between
Item 303 and Rule 10b-5
On closer consideration, it becomes evident that there are four distinct
possibilities when considering the relationship between Item 303 and Rule
10b-5: Item 303 violation only; Rule 10b-5 violation only; Item 303 and
Rule 10b-5 violation; and no violation.272
This section will use
hypotheticals to discuss the first three possibilities. In each of these
hypotheticals, a company is deciding whether it should disclose the
occurrence of a particular event, considering whether an omission of this
information would violate Item 303, Rule 10b-5, or both.
In scenario one, assume that a new regulation is proposed that, if
adopted, will require the company to completely redesign its product.
Assuming this event is not reasonably likely to occur, the two tests will
produce conflicting results. Under Item 303, no disclosure is necessary
because this event is not reasonably likely to occur.273 Under Rule 10b-5,
however, because the magnitude of the impact of the event is so great,
disclosure is required, even if the event has a low probability of coming to
fruition.274
In scenario two, assume that a new regulation is proposed that, if
adopted, will compel the company to purchase additional safety equipment
for its workers. Assume that the probability of this event occurring is 20
percent, but that the consequences will not be significant in magnitude.
Under these circumstances, because the event is reasonably likely to occur,
it must be disclosed under Item 303.275 Rule 10b-5, however, will not
require disclosure because of the combination of low probability and low
magnitude.276
In scenario three, assume that a new regulation is proposed that, if
adopted, will cause the company to recall the majority of the products it
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra Part II.A.1, II.C.
See supra Part II.A.2–3; see also Crawford & Galaro, supra note 10.
See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015).
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
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sold in the past year. Assume that adoption of this regulation is reasonably
likely to occur. In this situation, a company would be required to disclose
under both Item 303 and Rule 10b-5.277 It is this scenario that demonstrates
that, while not inevitable, a violation of Item 303 may serve as a basis for
liability under 10b-5.278
In scenario three, however, it is important to recognize that two separate
analyses are being conducted and that each violation plays a distinct role in
the 10b-5 analysis. The Item 303 violation does not speak to the materiality
requirement of a 10b-5 claim, but rather to the question of whether the
registrant had a duty to disclose.279 Plaintiffs also must establish that the
omitted information, which was alleged to constitute the Item 303 violation,
satisfies the materiality standard established under Basic.280 To be
successful, any plaintiff additionally must prove the remaining elements
required for a 10b-5 claim.281
C. Cases: Oran, Panthers Partners, and Litwin
Although both the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit relied on the
same three cases when analyzing whether Item 303 violations are actionable
under Rule 10b-5, they did so in different ways. This section will illustrate
why the Second Circuit’s analysis of each case should be accepted,
supporting the conclusion that such violations are actionable.
First, the Second Circuit correctly concluded that Oran left open the
possibility that a violation of Item 303 may produce liability under Rule
10b-5.282 Although the Oran Court did comment on the diverging
materiality standards of these two regulations, it did not foreclose the
possibility that there may be instances when the two overlap.283 Instead of
bifurcating its analysis, the Ninth Circuit combined the question of whether
there is a duty to disclose with the question of whether the information was
material.284
Although this Note concludes that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
Oran is more accurate, it is also important to consider whether Oran itself
was decided correctly. After analyzing the relationship between the
materiality standards of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5, it becomes clear that,
although not inevitable, there are situations in which a company’s omission
may constitute a violation of Item 303 and simultaneously satisfy the
materiality requirement of Rule 10b-5.285 Thus, this Note concludes that

277. See supra Part I.C.
278. See supra Parts I.C, II.C.
279. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015).
280. See id.
281. See supra Part I.C.1.
282. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04.
283. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that Item 303
violations do not “inevitably” or “automatically” constitute a material omission under Rule
10b-5).
284. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2014).
285. See supra Part III.B.
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Oran accurately articulates the relationship between Item 303 and Rule
10b-5.
This Note also advocates for the Second Circuit’s conclusion that Litwin
and Panther Partners are relevant to this issue. Although sections 11 and
12(a)(2) impose a lower burden on plaintiffs than Rule 10b-5, the test for
materiality is the same for all three causes of action.286 Thus, the
materiality standard applied to sections 11 and 12(a)(2) is distinct from
materiality for purposes of Item 303.287 Despite these diverging materiality
standards, in Panther Partners, the Second Circuit explicitly found that
Item 303 creates a duty to disclose that may serve as a basis for section 11
and 12(a)(2) claims.288 This bifurcated analysis allows courts to give
proper consideration to each materiality standard without unnecessarily
closing the door to certain forms of liability.289
The fact that several elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, including scienter,
are not required to bring a successful claim under sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
does not render claims brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) irrelevant to
those brought under Rule 10b-5.290 In all three claims, a material omission
may serve as a basis for liability if the party had a legal obligation to
disclose that information.291 It is important to note, however, that this
conclusion does not reduce the importance of the other elements required to
bring a successful claim under Rule 10b-5.292 As illustrated by NVIDIA
and Stratte-McClure, courts may disagree over the impact of an Item 303
violation and yet agree that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a
claim under Rule 10b-5.293 Thus, this analogy is appropriate to the limited
extent of illustrating the relationship between Item 303 violations and the
materiality standard established by the Supreme Court in Basic.294
D. The Role of Remedies
Following the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit would limit
enforcement of Item 303 violations.295 Although Stratte-McClure does not
go so far as to create a private right of action for Item 303 violations, by
connecting them to Rule 10b-5 claims, it changes the spectrum of remedies
286. See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011).
287. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04.
288. See Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir.
2012).
289. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104 (noting that Item 303 violations can mislead
investors and thus violate Rule 10b-5).
290. See id. at 102.
291. See id. (“This Court and our sister circuits have long recognized that a duty to
disclose under [s]ection 10(b) can derive from statutes or regulations that obligate a party to
speak.”). The Second Circuit also noted that this decision is supported by an SEC ceaseand-desist order, which held that omissions that violate Item 303 constituted violations of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id. at 102 n.5.
292. See supra Part I.C.1.
293. See supra Part II.D.
294. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104.
295. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar.
31, 1992).
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available to those harmed by such violations.296 Because one of the
remedies awarded for successful Rule 10b-5 claims is damages, allowing
violations of Item 303 to serve as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability will
provide a much greater incentive for companies to comply with Item 303
regulations.297
This is a desired result because of the intrinsic value Item 303 disclosure
provides to investors.298 The explanatory narrative of the required financial
statements is particularly helpful for evaluating “the likelihood that past
performance is indicative of future performance.”299 Although the SEC has
used its enforcement mechanisms to encourage compliance with Item 303
obligations, expanding liability to include the possibility of having to pay
damages provides an even stronger incentive to comply.300 While adopting
the holding of Stratte-McClure will most likely increase the number of
cases brought, the other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim will help protect
against an influx of unnecessary litigation.301
One counterargument, however, is that the creation of this liability may
cause companies to respond by disclosing too much information.302 The
requirements of Item 303, however, provide some intrinsic safeguards to
protect against this risk. First, because Item 303 requires issuers to disclose
negative trends and uncertainties, companies will not seek to provide more
information than necessary.303 Further, Item 303 is limited in scope. For
example, MD&A disclosure is limited to “known trends” or
“uncertainties.”304 It is unlikely that companies will expend resources to
gather additional information simply to inundate the investor with such
data.305
E. The Broader Impact
From the inception of a regulatory scheme centered on mandatory
disclosure, tension between the needs of the various participants in the
securities markets has spurred continuous calls for reform.306 While it will
not resolve all of these disputes, concluding that Item 303 may serve as a
basis for liability under Rule 10b-5 assists in creating a regulatory regime
that fosters the production of useful information. This section discusses the

296. See supra Part I.C.1.
297. See Dickey & Stern, supra note 8 (noting that the Second Circuit significantly
“raised the bar” for disclosure obligations).
298. See generally 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6.
299. Id.
300. See Caterpillar, Inc., 50 S.E.C. 903.
301. See Buergel, Ehrlich & Soloway, supra note 13.
302. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 696 (noting that more information is
not always better).
303. See supra Part I.C.3.
304. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016).
305. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 697 (noting that firms have an inherent
disincentive to produce information whose costs cannot be imposed on third parties).
306. See supra Part I.A–B.
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impact of such liability on companies, sophisticated investors, and
unsophisticated investors.
Although such liability imposes a stronger burden on companies to
provide sufficient disclosure under Item 303, this burden does not
necessarily impose exorbitant costs. First, because Item 303 is meant to
provide an insight into the manager’s perspective of the company,307 it is
unlikely that such disclosure will require the company to expend additional
resources on research. On the other hand, the company may be forced to
incur costs such as time, particularly the time of its management. This cost,
however, may simultaneously be a benefit to the company. Spending more
time preparing the MD&A may result in management having a better
understanding of the company and being better equipped to plan for its
future. This proposition also refutes the argument that additional disclosure
requirements will disadvantage smaller companies.308
In addition, concluding that Item 303 is actionable under Rule 10b-5 will
alleviate a company’s fear that other companies will be able to unfairly
exploit disclosed information.309 Because such disclosure is required of all
companies, each company can disclose information without the fear of
being unfairly disadvantaged.310 Further, as explicitly noted by the Second
Circuit, the SEC does not require companies to disclose “internal business
strategies or to identify the particulars of its trading positions.”311
This proposed resolution also provides benefits to both sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors. More thorough Item 303 disclosures reduce
expenses that sophisticated investors need to spend on gathering and
verifying such information.312 While these investors are less dependent on
the MD&A to understand disclosed financial information, such disclosure
still may assist them in understanding the trajectory of the company.313
Ensuring that companies comply with Item 303 is especially useful for
unsophisticated investors, who may not be as equipped as sophisticated
investors to discern the implications of the vast amount of financial data
disclosed by companies. While unsophisticated investors benefit from
prices that reflect publicly disclosed information, these prices do not always
accurately describe the risks associated with particular investments.314 Not
only does the resolution presented in Stratte-McClure encourage companies
to pay closer attention to Item 303 disclosures, but it also provides an
avenue for relief for those investors who truly were harmed by misleading
information.

307. See generally 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6.
308. See Gulati, supra note 7, at 689–90 (noting that disseminating such information is
more costly for smaller businesses than larger companies, putting smaller companies at a
relative disadvantage).
309. See Langevoort, supra note 104, at 116.
310. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 686.
311. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2015).
312. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 73, at 728.
313. See 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,428.
314. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 73, at 750.
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CONCLUSION
Although the debate surrounding mandatory disclosure began at the
inception of securities regulations, the circuit split concerning whether
violations of Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5
has only recently been brought to light. Soon after the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Item 303 violations are not actionable under Rule 10b-5, the
Second Circuit explicitly rejected that holding. Disagreeing with multiple
aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the Second Circuit held that Item
303 violations can serve as a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5. Noting
that this was a matter of first impression, the Second Circuit also qualified
this conclusion so that such liability may only be found if plaintiffs satisfy
all other requirements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, including the materiality
requirements set forth in Basic.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Note concludes that the Second
Circuit’s holding in Stratte-McClure should be accepted. The fact that
materiality standards for Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 are different does not
preclude information from simultaneously meeting both standards. In
addition, the importance of Item 303, and the unique insight it provides into
the status of a company, support a resolution that encourages accurate and
sufficient Item 303 disclosure. Thus, the Supreme Court should resolve this
dispute by holding that, in certain situations, violations of Item 303 may
result in successful Rule 10b-5 claims.

